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Using microdata on the 1995 cohort of Italian high school graduates, this paper studies the 
relationship between the type of high school attended (general versus technical; private 
versus public) and indicators of subsequent performance. Simultaneity issues that 
potentially bias this type of exercise are tackled by instrumental variables. Results indicate 
that choices greatly depend upon the family of origin and prior school performance. 
General high schools are found to increase the probability of transition to university and to 
improve performance once at university. On the other hand, private high schools appear to 
be associated with lower academic performance. Technical schools improve the quality of 
the school-to-work transition, both in terms of employment probabilities and earnings. 
Considering interactions between university and labour market participation decisions 
reduces the estimated direct impact of general high schools, while leaving the effects of 
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1. Introduction 
Italian educational policies are the subject of an intense debate. In March 2003 the Italian 
parliament approved a law of reform of the high school system which introduces a new 
vocational track that includes class work in the first two years and a mixture of class work 
and on-the-job training in the last couple of years, plus an additional fifth year for those 
wishing to enrol into university. The vocational track will parallel the ones of general and 
technical/professional high schools, based on five years of class work and with free access 
to university at the end. The new law warrants the possibility of transition between tracks.
1 
Overall, the new system will be similar to the ones adopted in some other European 
countries, namely Germany. Proponents of the new system emphasise the role that labour 
demand will play, via training schemes, in shaping the type of skills that vocational track 
students would acquire, therefore facilitating their school-to-work transitions; opponents 
stress the risks of social segmentation that such system could ingenerate through tracks 
separation, doubt the feasibility of transitions between tracks, and question the usefulness 
of learning job-specific skills during school years in a world of fast skill obsolescence. 
A second issue debated is school provision. Since 2000, school vouchers started being 
introduced by some regional governments, with the aim of helping households in choosing 
their preferred type of school, whether private or public. In September 2003 a new vouchers 
programme has been introduced nationwide. Given the difference in costs entailed by the 
two types of provision, vouchers lower the price differential between private schools and 
public ones, thereby shifting some demand for schooling from the latter to the former. Both 
freedom of choice and increases in private and public school quality (the latter brought 
about by greater competition) can be found among the principles inspiring vouchers 
programmes. Opponents to these policies question the ability of private schools in 
providing quality education and argue for employing public funds for improving the 
effectiveness of public schools. 
The policy debate prompts several scientific questions. To what extent the choice of a 
high school track affects later individual outcomes in terms of access to higher education, 
academic performance, and the school-to-work transition? How does the performance of 
private school students compare with that of public schools ones? Do differences in 
performance across high school types reflect a causal effect or are they due to endogenous 
                                                 
1 The reform goes in the opposite direction compared to the one introduced by the previous government in the 
late 1990s, in which track choice was deferred to the third year of secondary high education, after two years 
of uniform education.   2
sorting of students (due to unobservable ability or unobservable family characteristics, for 
example) across school types? This paper aims at providing answers to the above questions. 
Using survey data on a cohort of high school graduates, models of the impact of high 
school types (general versus technical; private versus public) on the transition to university, 
academic performance, labour market participation, employment probabilities and wages 
are estimated. In order to unravel the causal link between school choices and subsequent 
outcomes, great attention is devoted to endogenous selection issues, which are tackled by 
employing instrumental variables within a system of simultaneous limited dependent 
variables equations.  
The literature on the evaluation of school type effects on measures of performance has 
grown rapidly over the past decade. For example, the impact of catholic schools on 
academic performance has received considerable attention in the United States. Evans and 
Schwab (1995) highlight the endogeneity issues that can arise from self-selection of 
students into catholic schools and use instrumental variables to identify the effect of 
catholic school attendance on measures of academic success, concluding that catholic 
schools raise subsequent educational outcomes. Neal (1997) uses area-level measures of 
catholic schools availability as instruments for school choices, showing that the benefit of 
catholic schools are confined to urban minorities, possibly as a consequence of the low 
quality of available public schools. An instrumental variable procedure is employed by 
Figlio and Stone (1999) to assess the effect of religious and non-religious private schools 
on educational outcomes, finding that, in general, only the former increase individual 
outputs relative to public schools. The methodological approach developed by Altonji et al. 
(2000) is instead based on the use observable information as a way of reducing endogeneity 
bias; they find that catholic schools are effective in favouring high school completion, 
while the effect on transition to college is less evident. Recently, researchers’ interest on the 
effect of school choices have also started spreading onto other spheres of human life: an 
example is Figlio and Ludwig (2000), who look at the effect of catholic school attendance 
on youths’ crime, drug abuse and sexual activity, finding that catholic schools are effective 
in reducing all three. 
While catholic/private versus public schools effects have been extensively researched, 
the general versus technical or vocational high school divide is less explored, perhaps not 
surprisingly,  given that US high schools are characterised by greater uniformity under this 
respect compared to other countries, Italy included. Evidence for Germany indicates that   3
family income plays a limited role in determining the probability of attending general high 
schools, other factors such as parental education being more relevant (see, Buchel et al., 
2001, and Jenkins and Schluter, 2002).
2 For France, Margolis and Simonnet (2002) show 
that technical high school graduates outperform general high schools ones in the school-to-
work transition, thanks to the more effective labour market networks they can access. 
Positive earnings effects of vocational high schools compared to general high schools are 
reported by Moenjak and Worsick (2003) on a sample drawn from the labour force survey 
of  Thailand, after correcting for endogenous selection issues.  
Given their current political relevance, it is not surprising that the interest surrounding 
economics of education issues in Italy is increasing at a fast rate. The main issue emerging 
from the Italian literature is a strong intergenerational persistence in educational 
achievement. Checchi et al. (1999) compare intergenerational mobility in incomes and 
schooling attainment between Italy and the US, finding larger persistence in the former 
case, and argue that the Italian schooling system might have failed to provide poor families 
with the incentives to invest in the human capital of their off-springs. Besides family of 
origin, also high school types appear to be strongly associated to educational outcomes. 
Bertola and Checchi (2001) study a sample of university students from the University of 
Milan and find that those coming from general high schools score better than otherwise 
comparable students on a range of performance indicators. They also consider the 
differences in academic performance between public and private school students, finding 
that public schools are associated to the better performances, followed by religious private 
schools and lay private schools. The importance of high school types for academic 
performance is confirmed by Boero et al. (2001) who study a sample of Italian college 
graduate and show that the final graduation mark drops significantly if one compares 
general and technical high school graduates. The issue of public/private school choices is 
analysed in Checchi and Jappelli (2002) using subjective assessment of public school 
quality: they do not find evidence of any quality differential in favour of private school as 
determinant of the school choice. A theoretical perspective on the optimal school design is 
provided by Brunello and Giannini (2000), showing that considerations on the desirability 
of educational stratification can not be unambiguously drawn from an efficiency point of 
view. 
                                                 
2 A strong association between secondary school track choice and parental education in Germany has been 
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This paper’s empirical strategy extends the bivariate probit-type of models employed 
by Evans and Schwab (1995) and Neal (1997) among others. From a substantive point of 
view, these extensions allow to control for two endogenous treatments simultaneously 
(general  versus technical high school; private versus public high school) and for the 
presence of endogenous truncation on some of the outcomes of interest. Results change 
substantially when moving from completely exogenous models to the models introduced in 
this paper, showing how these extensions are relevant. Estimates show that choices greatly 
depend upon the family of origin and prior school performance. General high schools are 
found to increase the probability of transition to university and to improve performance 
once at university. On the other hand, private high schools appear to reduce academic 
performance. Technical schools improve the quality of the school-to-work transition, both 
in terms of employment probabilities and earnings. In the final part of the paper, 
interactions between university and labour market participation decisions are considered, 
showing that they reduce the estimated impact of general high schools, while leaving the 
effects of private schools unaltered. 
 
2. Data and descriptive patterns of high school choices and subsequent performances  
The data used in this paper originate from the “1998 Survey on the school and work 
experiences of 1995 high school graduates”, a cross-sectional sample of 18,843 high school 
leavers interviewed by the National Statistical Office (ISTAT) three years after graduation. 
The sample represents approximately 4 percent of the population of Italian high school 
graduates of 1995 and contains a wide range of information on the high school curriculum 
and on post high school experiences, either in the tertiary education system – including 
university – and the labour market. In addition, information on personal characteristics and 
family background is available.
3 
The Italian high school system at the time of interview may be broadly described by 
three types of schools: general (‘licei’), technical (‘istituti tecnici e professionali’) and 
teaching schools (‘istituti magistrali’). The first two types are based on a five-years 
curriculum, at the end of which students can freely chose to enrol in university.
4 General 
high schools are academic-oriented; technical ones, on the other hand, prepare students for 
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compulsory. The reform of the late 1990s raised compulsory education to 10 years. 
4 Before 1969 graduates from technical or professional high schools were required to pass an additional exam 
before they could enrol into university.   5
white collar or skilled blue collar careers. The third type is specifically aimed at training 
elementary school teachers and is structured into a four years curriculum, plus an additional 
year required to students who wish to go to university. In the present paper this latter group 
(which represented approximately 12 percent of the sample originally available) has been 
excluded from the estimation sample, due to the difference in the structure of the 
curriculum compared to the other two types. Thence, the choice of the high school track 
analysed here focuses on the general versus technical divide. 
As for the other dimension of the Italian debate on educational policies, i.e. the public 
versus private provision of schools, the Survey enables identification of the type of school 
attended by asking respondents if the school they enrolled in after compulsory education 
was private or public, and if they made any transition from private to public school (and 
vice versa) during high school. Differently from the work of Bertola and Checchi (2001), 
the data do not contain information on the confessional nature of private schools. 
The distribution of the type of school attended (general versus technical and public 
versus private) in the estimation sample is reported in Table 1. The estimation sample 
excludes those who are employed and started their job while at high school (3.6 percent of 
the original sample), since their post-graduation choices might not be comparable with 
those of the rest of the sample. In addition, the estimation sample for the analysis of 
academic performance excludes students who enrolled into short university diplomas (2.2 
percent of the original sample) because it was not possible to compute reliable indicators of 
academic performance due to small cells (see below for the definition of performance 
used), and those who did not report the information necessary for computing academic 
performance (0.05 percent). Graduates from general high schools represent 31 percent of 
the sample, whereas 12 percent of it graduated from a private high school. The two 
dimension of high school choices are strongly correlated. The probability of having a 
private school diploma is 9 percent among graduates from technical schools and 19 percent 
among students from the licei. The other conditional frequencies presented in the table 
show that the incidence of students from general high schools is some 17 percent larger 
among private school graduates than in the overall sample. One explanation of the positive 
association between the two variables can be found in the larger supply of private education 
in the general high schools system: official statistics for 1989 indicate that while 14 percent 
of technical schools were private, the proportion was 30 percent for general high schools. A 
second reason has to do with family resources: both private and general schools entail   6
larger costs than public or technical ones, either in term of fees and expected opportunity 
costs. 
Household incomes are not available in the data; however, the survey contains rather 
detailed information on parental education and occupation which partly compensates for the 
unavailability of incomes. The association between school types and parents’ education is 
described in Table 2. The more educated any of the parents, the more likely it is that the 
children have a general type of degree, with the probability that roughly quadruples when 
going from parents with none or low educational attainment to parents with university 
degrees. As long as education is positively associated with incomes, this finding might 
reflect larger financial endowments of high-education families, which can thus afford to 
place their children in an academic oriented track. A second explanation has to do with 
preferences, as long as more educated parents attach higher value to education then less 
educated ones, and thus prefer general tracks which are more likely to continue with higher 
education. Finally, parents education might influence children studying capabilities, thereby 
lowering the costs of their investments in education. Parents’ education is also positively 
associated with the probability of graduating from private schools, possibly reflecting 
financial endowments. 
The association between parents’ occupation and school choices is described by Table 
3. General school graduates typically tend to come from families where parents are in high-
level non manual, managerial or professional occupations. Moreover, also teachers’ 
children tend to graduate in general schools. On the other hand, private school leavers are 
likely to come from families where parents are self-employed. 
The link between previous academic performance (measured by the mark reported in 
the final exam of the junior high school) and school choices is illustrated in Table 4. The 
better the performance, the larger the probability of graduating from general schools, rising 
by 7 times when moving from the lowest to the highest mark. Differences in ability across 
marks are an explanation for this evidence, the other possibility being better performances 
from children from high education/high income families compared to the rest of the sample. 
The opposite link, i.e. decreasing with the marks, can be observed for the probability of 
graduating in private schools, although the variation is much less astonishing than in the 
case of the probability of graduating in general schools. The negative association might 
signal that private education is used as remedial education, and is therefore more frequent   7
among students at higher risk of experiencing problems in the course of their academic 
career (see Bertola and Checchi, 2001, on this point). 
After having described the associations between family backgrounds and high school 
choices, in Table 5 the links between choices and subsequent academic performance are 
considered. Two are the dimensions of academic performance taken into account. The first 
is the probability of attending university at the time of interview. The second is the speed in 
passing university exams. Exams can be taken at different dates during the year, and there 
are no restrictions on the number of times each exam can be taken before being passed. 
Such a system creates great dispersion in the number of exams passed per year, and exam 
taking speed depend to a large extent on individual ability and commitment. To exploit 
such variation, for each of eight broad disciplinary areas in which university courses can be 
grouped (sciences; medicine; engineering; architecture; economics, business administration 
and statistics; political sciences; law; and the humanities), the median number of exams 
passed per year has been computed; the speed indicator is a dummy for being above the 
median in the subject-specific distribution of the numbers of exams passed per year. 
Clearly, this is an imperfect performance indicator, since it does not take the marks 
obtained into account.
5 However, no information on marks is reported in the survey. 
Moreover, one of the main concerns inspiring the recent reforms of university degrees has 
been the long duration of university studies in the old system, so that studying the impact of 
high school choices on the speed in taking exams will yield insights on an issue at the core 
of Italian educational policies.  
Table 5 shows that 40 percent of high school graduates attend university three years 
after graduation. The proportion halves among technical school graduates and doubles 
among general school graduates, revealing a strong link between type of degree held and 
transition to university. Transitions to university are more frequent among private school 
graduates than they are among public schools ones, although the magnitude of the link is 
less evident than in the previous case. Due to discontinuities in the distribution of exam 
passed per year, the sample proportion of cases above the median (the ‘fast tracks’) is 45 
percent. Graduating from a general high school changes this proportion only slightly, by 4 
percent; on the other hand, the proportion of fast exam takers among technical school 
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graduates is 38 percent. Evidence on the private/public school divide shows little variation 
in speed.  
The second dimension of students performance considered in this paper are early 
labour market outcomes; in particular, the probability of engaging in job search activities, 
the probability of being employed and the probability of being low paid are taken into 
account. The ISTAT questionnaire contains a wide array of information on both job search 
and the characteristics of the current job. As for academic performance, also in this case 
graduates from teaching schools and those who started their current jobs while at high 
school have been excluded from the sample. In addition, after testing for endogenous 
selection and failing to reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity, those who work as self-
employed (4.6 percent of the original sample) have been excluded from the estimation 
sample. Also, excluded are employees with missing wages (an additional 2.6 percent of the 
original sample). Therefore, the estimation sample for the analysis of economic 
performance differs from the one used for analysing academic performance, and consists of 
14,420 observations. The proportions of graduates from general and private schools, as well 
as the variation of these proportions by family backgrounds in this sample are very similar 
to the ones shown in Tables 1-5. 
Table 6 illustrates the variation of early labour market outcomes in the sample. An 
individual is defined as having done some search if she has an occupation of any kind or if 
she reports herself being on job search. The employment status considered refers to 
continual employment; unemployed individuals having done some work in the week prior 
to interview or those on occasional or seasonal jobs are not counted as employed. Partly, 
such a choice is driven by the data, since no information on job attributes is collected for 
seasonal or occasional employment; in addition, it allows to focus on stable employment, 
which is probably more relevant from a policy perspective. Low pay is defined as the 
bottom quartile of the sample distribution of net hourly pay, i.e. the low pay threshold is 
defined relatively to the group of high school graduates. After graduation, job search occurs 
for 68 percent of the sample. The proportion rises to 81 percent among technical school 
graduates and falls to 40 percent for general school ones, clearly indicating a difference in 
the propensity for labour market activities between the two educational tracks. A slight 
difference in job search propensities can also be observed between public and private 
schools graduates. Of those who search, 42 percent are observed in employment. This 
rather low figure depends upon the definition of employment adopted: if one included also   9
seasonal employment, occasional employment and the unemployed reporting hours of 
works in the week prior to interview, the employment rate would be 68 percent. The 
employment rate varies depending upon the type of high school attended, passing from the 
49 percent of technical schools graduates to the 16 percent of licei students; some 
variability is evident also between private and public schools. Finally, some associations 
between school choices and the probability of earning low wages can be detected, although 
they are less evident compared to the case of employment. 
 
3. High school choices and academic performance 
The previous section has shown that the link between the type of high school diploma and 
the probability of going to university is well evident in the data, and similar conclusions 
apply for the speed in passing exams once at university. In order to disentangle the effect of 
school types on outcomes, endogeneity issues that are likely to influence raw correlations 
have to be tackled. One first source of endogeneity has to do with selection into school 
types, as long as unobserved ability and unobserved parental background might influence 
both choices and outcomes; as shown in Neal (1997) such a circumstance can be relevant as 
long as school choices are driven by expected returns on education.  Second, the analysis of 
exams speed can only be performed conditional on university attendance; as long as the 
sample of university students is not representative of the population of high school 
graduates, estimates can be biased. What is needed, therefore, is an econometric model that 
jointly handles endogenous school choices and endogenous sample selection. Given that the 
parameters of interest are unconditional on labour market decisions (i.e. as in, for example, 
Ewans and Schwab, 1995, estimating the effect of job search decisions on university 
attendance is not the aim of this paper) the academic performance model is estimated 
without taking those decisions into account.
6  
 
3.1 The model of academic performance 
In this paper the endogeneity issues discussed above are assessed by means of multivariate 
probit models. Let observations in the estimation sample be indexed by i, i=1…n, and let 
the latent propensities to graduate from general schools (g*i) and private schools (p*i) be 
linear functions of individual characteristics: 
                                                 
6 Insights on the relevance of allowing for interactions between university and labour market choices are 





where the xs are vectors of observable attributes such as gender, parental background and 
indicators of academic performance at the junior high stage, the βs associated parameter 
vectors to be estimated and the εs error terms assumed to be distributed as standard normal. 
When the latent propensities cross some unobserved thresholds –which can be fixed at zero 
without loss of generality– individuals are observed to graduate from general or private 
schools; let gi=I(g*i>0) and pi=I(p*i>0) be dummy variables indicating the two events, the 
indicator function I( ) taking value one whenever its argument is true and zero otherwise. 
Next, assume that the latent propensity to be observed at university at the date of 
interview, u*i, depends linearly on a set of personal characteristics zu, and high school 
choices gi and pi:  
 
u*i= βu’zui+δggi+δppi+εui  (3)
 
where the error term εu is assumed to be distributed as standard normal; let ui=I(u*i>0) be a 
dummy variable signalling university attendance at the date of interview. 
Finally, conditionally on university attendance, academic performance can be 
observed. As explained in Section 2, speed in passing exams is the performance indicator 
available in the data. Let ni, the average number of exams passed per year by individual i, 
depend on personal attributes ms and high school choices according to the following 
relationship: 
 
s*i≡h(ni)=βsmsi+γggi+γppi+εsi    if ui=1  (4)
 
where h( ) is a suitable monotonic unspecified transformation such as the error tem of (4) is 
distributed as standard normal, while the relationship is unobservable when individuals are 
not at university, i.e. when ui=0. An individual is classified to be a ‘fast’ whenever she lies 
in the upper half of the subject-specific distribution of ni; let si=I(ni>µ) signal that event, 
where µ is the median of the subject-specific distribution of exam passed per year. Note 
that speed is conditional on both high school choices and university attendance.   11
The vector of error terms ε
A







where the correlation matrix Ω has unit diagonal elements and extra-diagonal elements 
equal to ρjk, j,k=g,p,u,s. Overall, the model specified is a four-variate probit with censoring 
of one equation.
7  
Estimation of cross-equation correlation coefficients allows to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, therefore eliminating the issues of endogeneity discussed above. The 
potential endogeneity of high school choices and selection into university can be tested by 
testing the significance of the elements of Ω.  
Model identification requires valid “instruments”, i.e. variables that can be excluded 
from the outcome equations (u* or s*) but significantly affect high school choices or 
selection into university. Candidates as instruments for high school choices are measures of 
family characteristics relevant at the time the choice was made, but whose effect on 
students behaviour can be expected to be less relevant in the university years, after their 
impact on high school choices has been taken into account. The instrument used for general 
high school is a dummy for having a grandparent with a university degree, i.e. it is assumed 
that second order intergenerational persistence loses relevance in shaping students’ choices 
as they age from 14 to 19. The private school equation includes the same variable and a 
dummy for the mother being retired when the individual was 14.
8 Instrumenting selection 
into university requires variables that affect the choice of going to university but have no 
residual impact on exams speed. In particular, dummies for the number of siblings in the 
household of origin will be used here. 
 
3.2 Results 
Table 7 presents in column (1) results from the estimation of the four-variate probit with 
censoring; in particular, it provides “marginal effects”, evaluated at the means of 
                                                 
7 Computation of multi-variate normal distributions is performed by simulation, in particular by applying the 
so-called GHK simulator. 
8 Parental labour market status when interviewees were 14 is available in the data, and tests indicate that, as a 
whole, it can be excluded from high school equations. Taken in isolation, the dummy for mother retired is 
found to be significant in the private school equation.   12
explanatory variables. For comparative purposes, column (2) of the table also reports 
estimation of academic performance equations from univariate probit models, i.e. ignoring 
the endogeneity issues.  
The bottom part of the table shows results from tests of significance of the 
instruments, performed using functional form as identifying restriction. The tests indicate 
that the data support the choice of instruments made: high school choices are significantly 
affected by grandparents’ education and by the mother retirement status when the 
individual was 14, but have no residual impact on the transition to university; similarly, the 
presence and number of siblings affects the probability of attending university at the date of 
interview, but have no impact on exam taking speed. 
Three of the cross-equation correlation coefficients are statistically significant at 
conventional confidence levels, whereas remaining coefficients are not statistically 
different from zero. The correlation between general high schools and private high schools 
(ρgp) appears to be positive and very precisely estimated, confirming the evidence already 
emerged in Section 2 about the strong link between the two variables. Differently from 
there, however, in this section controls are made for family resources, so it is likely that the 
positive coefficient reflects a larger supply of private education among general schools than 
among technical ones. The correlation between private high schools and exams speed (ρps) 
is also positive, indicating that the group of private school graduate that go to university is 
faster in passing exams compared to the average of university students. Finally, the positive 
estimate of the correlation between university attendance and exams speed (ρus) indicates 
that there is positive selection into university, i.e. those who are not observed at university 
would have been slower in taking exams compared to those currently attending; if exams 
speed can be deemed as an ability indicator, this result suggests that those observed at 
university are intrinsically more able than those not attending, net of family backgrounds. 
The table also reports tests for the overall ignorability of high school equations, i.e. tests for 
the hypotheses that all correlation coefficients referring to a certain high school equation 
are simultaneously equal to zero, and shows that both processes are non-ignorable for the 
estimation of academic performance. A test of overall significance of the correlation 
structure of unobservables also points to the necessity of tackling the various endogeneity 
issues.  
The first two sub-columns of column (1) (P(general) and P(private)) provide estimates 
of the determinants of high school choices. The presence of a favourable family   13
background affects both choices significantly. In particular, while general high school 
graduates tend to come from families where one or both parents, are in managerial or 
professional occupations, private schools are chosen more frequently when the parents are 
self-employed or entrepreneurs. Also, teachers’ children are likely to graduate from general 
and public high schools. Parental education positively and strongly influences both 
probabilities. The indicator of academic performance at junior high school, i.e. before 
entering high school, is strongly and positively associated to the probability of graduating 
from a general high school. Much smaller effects, and in the opposite direction, can be 
observed for private high schools. Overall, results appear to confirm previous findings from 
Bertola and Checchi (2002) on the fact that private schools attract students from richer 
families and with relatively lower ability compared to public schools ones, whereas general 
high schools attract higher performance individuals from richer families. 
The estimated effects of graduating from a general high schools on the probability of 
attending university at the interview date is 43 percent for an individual with other 
observable attributes equal to the sample mean. This effect compares with an estimate of 47 
percent retrievable from the model without endogeneity controls (see column (2), 
P(university)). The small change in the estimated effect between the two cases reflects the 
fact that the correlation of unobservables between the two equations (ρgu) is not statistically 
different from zero. Note, however, that a dramatic drop characterises the asymptotic t-ratio 
when moving from the exogenous to the endogenous model, reflecting the fact that in the 
latter case the information is used over a wider parameter space. Similar evidence 
characterises the marginal effect for private school. In this case, the drop in significance is 
crucial, since it leads to conclude that there is no effect of private high school attendance on 
transitions to university. The significance of the negative effect emerging from the 
exogenous model is a consequence of omitting to control for the role of observable 
attributes – namely parental background and junior high school marks – in the 
determination of private school choices.  
Estimates associated to parental education indicate a strong intergenerational 
persistence in higher education: the effect on university attendance roughly doubles when 
parental educational attainment passes from high school degrees to university degrees. 
Parents’ occupation also affects university attendance significantly. A similar remark 
applies to junior high school marks. The regression also controls for the final high school   14
mark and, not surprisingly, it appears to be strongly associated to the probability of being at 
university. 
The importance of controlling for endogeneity is confirmed by the estimates of the 
exam speed equation, as shown by the rise in size of the effect of general high schools 
(remarks similar to those put forward when commenting P(university) apply to the drop in 
significance): general high schools have a positive impact on speed, and when such impact 
is computed in the entire sample, rather than from a high-speed sub-sample, the magnitude 
of the effect rises by more than 50 percent. If factors that positively affect speed are 
magnified by the endogenous selection control, the opposite should hold for speed reducing 
variables: see, for example, the drop in the marginal effect associated to residence in 
southern regions. Private schools also negatively affect speed. In this case, however, the 
sign of the bias is dominated by other sources of unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated 
positive correlation between unobservables of the private school and speed equation (ρps) 
indicates that individuals from private schools going to university have a speed propensity 
larger than the average. In the exogenous model the marginal effect of private schools on 
speed is a convolution of a negative causal effect and a positive selection term, which is 
removed from the marginal effect in the endogenous model. Estimates indicate that 
endogeneity is relevant, the negative effect of private schools on speed more than doubling 
when moving from the exogenous to the endogenous model. 
Estimates of marginal effects on the other covariates in the speed equation point 
towards the importance of both parental backgrounds and individual ability (measured by 
marks reported at junior high and high schools) as explanatory factors of this dimension of 
academic performance. 
 
4. High school choices and early labour market outcomes 
The raw correlations presented in Section 2 indicate the existence of a strong link between 
the type of high school attended and behaviours at labour market entry; in this section the 
extent to which those associations can be imputed a causal interpretation is investigated. As 
in Section 3, endogeneity of high school choices is controlled for by explicitly modelling 
their determinants and by allowing any residual component to freely correlate with the 
outcomes of interest. Endogenous selection issues are also investigated; however – 
differently from Section 3 –  in this section, a double selectivity process is modelled: 
selection into job search activity (potentially endogenous for the estimation of employment   15
probabilities) and selection into employment (potentially endogenous for the estimation of 
low pay probabilities). The model is estimated without taking university attendance into 
account, deferring an analysis of its interactions with labour market outcomes to Section 5. 
 
4.1 The model of early labour market outcomes 
The probability of graduating from certain types of high school is modelled in the same 
fashion of Section 3, but on a partly different sample (see Section 2 for the differences in 
sample selection rules between this and the previous section); thence, the first two 
equations of the model are equations (1) and (2) of Section 3.  
The first labour market outcome considered is the job search decision. Let r*i, the 
latent propensity to engage in job search activities after high school graduation for 
individual i, be a linear function of personal attributes zr, high school choices and an error 




and let ri=I(r*i>0) be a dichotomous indicator of the search activity.  
The employment status at the date of interview can be observed for those individuals 
who search for a job (recall from Section 2 that self-employment is excluded from the 
analysis and that seasonal or occasional jobs are considered as unemployment). Assume 
that it represents some unobserved employment propensity e*i, which depends upon 
personal attributes me and school choices: 
 
e*i=βe’mei+θggi+θppi+εei    if ri=1  (7)
 
and let ei=I(e*i>0) indicate whether an individual is employed or not at the interview date. 
The employment process is censored for those who do not participate in the labour market 
after graduation. 
Besides employment probabilities, another relevant dimension of the school-to-work 
transition is the wage level that individuals obtain on entry into the labour market. Clearly, 
entry levels are not fully informative of future earnings prospects, since the correlation 
between initial and later earnings varies depending upon which model better describes 
labour market functioning. The focus is placed on the probability of low pay for two   16
reasons. First, from a substantive point of view, in recent years low pay has emerged as a 
policy issue in many countries, and research on this topic stresses that as long as there are 
discontinuities in the earnings process across the distribution, the relevance of earnings 
determinants might vary according to the earnings quantiles considered. Second, from a 
modelling point of view, estimating an earnings equation in the multivariate probit context 
of this paper would have required to assume normality or log-normality of earnings, 
whereas by focussing on low pay probabilities, normality is required only up to any 
unspecified transformation of earnings (as will be shown below). Finally, it has been 
chosen to derive the low pay cut-off from the sample earnings distribution, i.e. to focus on 
individual earnings relative to the cohort of high school graduates. 
Let individual earnings wi depend upon personal and job attributes ql and high school 
choices according to the following equation: 
 
f(wi)=ψ’qli + ωggi+ωppi+vi   if ei=1  (8.a)
 
where f( ) is a monotonic unspecified transformation such as the error term vi is distributed 
as standard normal; let also p25 indicate the first quartile of the earnings distribution. Note 
that the earnings distribution is censored upon employment (and, a fortiori, upon search). 
An individual is counted as low paid whenever wi <  p 25, i.e. when f(wi)< f (p25). By 
subtracting each side of (8.a) from f(p25), the earnings process can be rewritten as: 
 
l*i=βl’qli+ϕggi+ϕppi+εli  if ei=1  (8.b)
 
where l*i≡ f(p25)–f(wi), the first element of βl subsumes the difference between f(p25) and 
the constant term in ψ, remaining elements of βl are the same as the corresponding 
elements of ψ but with opposite sign, ϕg,p≡–ω g,p and εli≡– vi. Note that now coefficients 
associated to covariates parameterise low wages. Observing an individual in low pay means 
that the corresponding latent variable l*i is positive; let li=I(l*i >0) be a dichotomous 
indicator of the low pay event. 
As in the case of academic performance, endogeneity of high school choices and 
(double nested) selection is tackled by means of a multivariate probit model, which 
emerges if one assumes that the vector of error terms ε
L
i=(εgi, εpi, εsi, εei, εli) follows the 






where the correlation matrix Σ has unit diagonal elements and extra-diagonal elements 
equal to λjk, j,k=g,p,r,e,l. Overall, the model specified is a five-variate probit with nested 
censoring of two equations. Test of the endogeneity of high school choices and selection 
can be performed by testing the significance of the cross-equation correlation coefficients 
of unobservables. 
Identifying restrictions for the model of early labour market outcomes are as follows. 
The job search equation is identified using the same indicators of family characteristics 
relevant at the time high school choices were made used in Section 3, i.e. a dummy for 
having at least one grandparent holding a university degree in the general high school 
equation, and that dummy plus a dummy indicating if the mother was retired when the 
interviewed was 14 in the private school equation. Variables that are –plausibly– not taken 
into account by employers when screening job candidates might serve for the purpose of 
identifying the employment equation, the mark reported at junior high school being an 
example of such variables. Empirically, however, it was found that not only junior high 
marks, but also high school marks were insignificant in shifting employment probabilities, 
suggesting that employers do not value the informative content of marks, but probably limit 
themselves at considering signal embedded in the type of diploma (general versus 
technical) obtained.
9 Therefore, both marks have been used as instruments for employment 
probabilities. Finally, indicators of parental backgrounds could be excluded from the low 
pay equation after their impact on schooling choices and employment probabilities have 
been controlled for. In practice, it was found that maternal background (both in terms of 
educational attainment and occupation) produced the better performance in terms of 




Table 8 illustrates results obtained estimating the economic performance model. For the 
sake of compactness, high school equations are not reported; results on the determinants of 
                                                 
9 Boero et al. (2001) find that high school and university marks have no explanatory power in wage 
regressions for their sample of Italian college graduates.   18
high school choices were very similar to those obtained from the academic performance 
model (see also the reported correlation coefficient between unobservables of high school 
equations, virtually identical to the one of Table 7), and are available upon request.  
The adopted identification strategy is supported by the data –see the p-values for 
instruments significance in the various equations reported at the bottom of the table. 
Estimated correlations of unobservables indicate that general high school graduates have a 
job search propensity which is lower than the one of technical school ones. This could be 
the case if general high school graduates could count on higher non labour incomes even 
after controlling for the wide range of family background indicators available in the data. 
Alternatively, one might argue that these individuals are of a less labour-market-oriented 
type compared with graduates from technical schools. A negative relationship also emerges 
between general high schools and employment probabilities. Again, an explanation based 
on differential inclinations towards the labour market across high school types could 
rationalise this fact. On the other hand, the correlation between general high school and low 
pay propensity is non significant. Taking into account correlations involving the private 
school equation, the only significant coefficient is the one with low pay, indicating that 
private school graduates have an intrinsically lower earnings potential relative to private 
school students. Remaining correlation coefficients indicate that also selectivity processes 
are a vehicle for estimates bias. For example, the unobservables of search and employment 
propensities are negatively and significantly correlated, indicating that the intrinsic 
employability of those who search is lower compared to the population of high school 
graduates. Also, employment and low pay propensities are negatively correlated: had the 
unemployed found a job, their low pay chances would have been larger than the ones of the 
employed, suggesting that unemployment is due to lack of demand rather than to high 
reservation wages. Tests for the significance of groups of correlation coefficients indicate 
that none of the high schools processes is ignorable, and that the whole correlation structure 
is statistically significant, both facts that motivate the use of the simultaneous equations 
model. 
Comparing estimated marginal effects between models with endogenous and 
exogenous high school choices further motivates the employed modelling strategy. For 
example, the search probability differential between general and technical schools is -28 
percent in the exogenous model of column (2). Endogenisation reduces the estimated effect 
by a half: the causal impact of general high school reduces search probabilities by 13   19
percent, whereas the remaining part of the effect estimated in the exogenous model is due 
to endogenous sorting. The negative effect that persists after endogenisation indicates that 
general high schools reduce the probability that a random individual engages in search 
activities after completing high school compared to technical schools, as could be the case 
if the type of skills acquired or the overall school environment were more market oriented 
in the latter case. Taking into account the private/public schools divide, the data indicate 
that the differential is small and not statistically significant. As for the other determinants of 
search propensities in column (1), the data indicate that the two sets of characteristics that 
are relevant in determining high school choices – family background and previous 
performances at school – still play a role after the impact of high school choices on search 
probability has been taken into account. For example, search probabilities are smaller when 
there are no siblings, where parents have high educational attainment, or where parents are 
located on high ranks of the occupational ladder. 
The importance of taking selectivity issues into account is confirmed by looking at 
results on employability. The marginal effect of general high schools on employment 
probabilities is negative and drops by 10 percent in absolute value when one moves from 
the exogenous to the endogenous model. This finding is a result of the negative correlation 
of unobservables between general high schools and employment equations; net of this 
negative sorting bias, technical schools graduates still have an employment probability 20 
percent larger compared to general schools graduates. It should be stressed that the negative 
selection effect operates in the opposite direction: since the sample involved in search 
activity has a lower employment probability compared to the overall sample, the impact of 
factors that negatively influence employment is overestimated in the sample doing search, 
and we should observe the marginal effect of general high schools to become more negative 
after accounting for endogenous selection. The data, however, indicate that negative sorting 
of less employable individuals into the pool of high school graduates is predominant, and 
simultaneously accounting for the two endogeneity issues reduces the size of the effect. No 
significant effect on employment probabilities, on the other hand, can be associated to the 
choice of a private high school. Remaining marginal effects reveal the existence of a 10 
percent gender gap and of marked regional differences, youths from the south and islands 
showing an employment probability which is 41.2 percent lower than that of otherwise 
comparable individuals. The data also indicate the relevance of household characteristics as 
determinants of employment probabilities, a likely consequence of the association between   20
the former and non-labour incomes on which job searchers can count. For example, the 
presence of siblings is associated with positive marginal effects, whereas a favourable 
educational background reduces employment probabilities. 
Relevant selection biases emerge if one compares estimates of low pay probabilities 
from the exogenous and endogenous model, see e.g. the rise in absolute value of the effects 
of high school choices; in the case of private schools, the rise is also reinforced by making 
allowance for the positive sorting of low wage individuals into private schools (i.e. ρpl>0). 
Overall, the model shows that general high schools significantly increase low pay 
probabilities relative to technical ones, whereas private school reduce such probabilities 
compared to public schools. The first finding confirms that the type of education provided 
by technical schools increases economic performance. Explanations for the second finding 
are less evident. Marginal effects for the other covariates show the existence of a relevant 
gender pay gap and of marked territorial differentials. The father’s educational attainment 
increases low pay probabilities. The mode of search significantly affects low pay chances. 
In particular, those who have found the current job through a family network (i.e. the 
excluded category in the estimation of coefficients underlying marginal effects) seem to 
have the largest low pay probability. Since family networks are the most important search 
mode in Italy, especially for first job seekers, this result is rather interesting and is 
consistent with two not mutually exclusive explanation: family networks are used by less 
able individuals or family networks tend to provide low wage jobs. The other ‘wage 
determinants’ included in the low pay equation have marginal effects that go in the 
expected directions; for example, low pay probabilities decrease as we move towards high 
level occupations or large firms, and as more tenured employees are taken into account. It 
should be noted that the absolute value of the effects is larger in the endogenous model 
compared with the exogenous one, further confirming the importance of allowing for the 
various selectivity issues analysed in this paper. 
 
5. Assessing interactions between academic performance and labour market outcomes 
Results presented so far refer to academic and economic behaviour taken in isolation from 
each other. Thence, the effects estimated provide the overall impact of a given high school 
choice on the outcomes of interest, i.e. without distinguishing the direct effect from spill 
over and feedback effects between the academic and economic spheres. For example, 
finding, as in Section 3, that general high school students are faster in passing exams   21
compared to their counterparts graduated from technical high schools might result from the 
greater time that general school students, less involved in labour market activities than 
technical schools ones, can devote to exams preparation or from a direct effect of school 
type, holding labour market behaviour fixed. Similarly, the employment and wage penalties 
characterising general school students compared to those from technical ones could be due 
to the greater involvement of the former in tertiary education, or might be present even after 
controlling for university choices. In general, disentangling between direct and indirect 
effects is important since it can yield insights on the extent to which the overall impacts 
estimated in the previous sections reflect differences in post-school choices or differentials 
in performances holding choices fixed.  
The raw data indicate a clear association between academic and labour market 
outcomes after high school graduation; for example the probability of attending university 
is 22 percent among job seekers and the employed, and 85 percent among those inactive in 
the labour market, while conditionally on university attendance the probability of passing 
exam fast is 35 percent in the former group and 53 in the latter. Looking at the labour 
market, participation probabilities vary from 38 to 91 percent if one compares university 
students with non students, corresponding figures being 12 and 53 percent for employment 
probabilities, while no remarkable difference can be observed in low pay probability (26 
and 24 percent). Given these figures, it is plausible to expect that part of the effects of high 
school types on academic performance (early labour market outcomes) estimated in the 
previous sections vanish after taking early labour market outcomes (academic performance) 
into account. 
From the modelling point of view, what is required is to allow for interactions 
between academic and economic outcomes. Considering university attendance and job 
search, there is no clear a priori on the sequence of the two decisions: the safest strategy is 
to consider them as simultaneous – not mutually excludable– choices, and their interaction 
can be modelled in a reduced form fashion, similarly to the general/private school 
interaction in the previous sections.
10 Exam passing speed can be conditioned on job 
search, using the same identifying restrictions used for identifying selection into university. 
The other relevant dimension of labour market outcomes upon which academic 
performance could be conditioned is employability. However, attempts at estimating the 
                                                 
10 Such a strategy is further motivated by the difficulty of finding plausible exclusion restrictions for 
conditioning the two events upon each other, especially given that the conditioning sets in equation (3) and (6) 
coincide.   22
exam speed equation with both the search and employment dummies as regressors 
encountered convergence problems, suggesting lack of identification.
11 Therefore, the 
extended academic performance model is the model of Section 3, augmented with a job 
search equation and including the job search dummies among the regressors of the exam 
speed equation. The extended labour market model is the model of Section 4 augmented 
with a university attendance equation, and including the university dummy among the 
regressors of the employment and low pay equations. 
Table 9 reports marginal effects estimated from the extended models.
12 The reduced 
form correlation between university attendance and job search –not reported—was 
estimated at -0.67 in both cases, with asymptotic t-ratios larger than 50, reflecting the 
strong negative association between the two outcomes already emerged from the raw data. 
The effect of general high schools on university attendance probability is now 36 percent, 
compared with the 43 percent of Table 7. Therefore, part of the effect estimated in Section 
3 was a reflection of the fact that general high school reduce search probabilities, and 
university attendance and job search are negatively associated. Previous conclusions on the 
absence of effects of private schools on university attendance are instead confirmed. 
Considering the exam speed equation, the effects of general schools (+15 percent in Section 
3) becomes statistically insignificant, whereas a -12 percent  effect can be imputed to the 
search dummy –although the underlying coefficient is not very precisely estimated. The 
differential exam speed between general and technical school is therefore entirely due to the 
more intense job search propensity of technical school students that go to university, which 
lower their performance. The negative effect of private schools, conversely, retains roughly 
the size and significance already estimated in Section 3.  
The effect of general high schools on job search probabilities is hardly affected by the 
inclusion of a university attendance equation in the labour market model, see Table 9, 
column 2. Conversely, controlling for university attendance reduces the effect of general 
high schools on employment probabilities by two thirds, while the university dummy 
included among the regressors of that equation attracts a stunning – 30 percent effect. 
Therefore, only a part of the employment penalty characterising general school students in 
comparison with technical school ones can be thought of as a direct effect (say due to the 
fact that general knowledges are less valued in the labour market compared to technical 
                                                 
11 Considering that the proportion of cases scoring 1 on both exam speed and employment is 0.7 percent of the 
estimation sample, identification issues might originate from problems of “small cells”. 
12 The full set of estimates underlying the table is available upon request.   23
skills), the rest being imputable to the larger incidence of university attendance (which 
presumably weakens job search effectiveness) among students from general high schools. 
Similar remarks apply for the impact of general high schools on low pay probabilities, 
changing from almost 18 percent to zero when comparing estimates in Tables 8 and 9, but 
this time the effect does not pass to the university attendance dummy. As for academic 
performance, conclusions on the impact of private schools are robust to the inclusion of a 
university attendance equation in the labour market model.  
 
6. Concluding remarks 
The high school choices of young Italians largely depend on two factors: ability and family 
background. This paper has shown that better performance individual and those with 
favourable educational and occupational family background  tend to select into general high 
schools. On the other hand, the probability of graduating from a private school rises with 
the availability of resources in the family of origin but decreases with school performance 
prior to high school. 
This paper has provided evidence on the effects of high school choices on subsequent 
academic performances. Graduating from a general high school substantially increases the 
probability of attending university, whereas no shift in such a probability due to private 
schools can be found in the data after a proper allowance is made for simultaneity issues. 
Once at university, the speed in passing exams – a crucial performance indicator for today’s 
Italian students—is found to depend positively on general school attendance and negatively 
on private school one. Therefore, while attending a general high school can be seen as a 
way of improving ones academic outcomes, the data indicate that private schools, if 
anything, reduce them. 
High school effects are not confined to college outcomes, but also spread on the 
school-to-work transition. This time, patterns are reversed, and graduates from technical 
schools score much better on either the probability of finding a stable job, or the probability 
of finding a job above a pre-determined low pay cut-off. Given that the model controls for 
observed and unobserved heterogeneity, these results are unlikely to reflect a low quality of 
general schools students that go on the labour market; rather, they may be given a causal 
interpretation, suggesting that generalist skills are not valued in the youths’ labour market. 
On the other hand, private school attendance is found to reduce low pay probabilities.    24
Further analysis on the role of interactions between academic and labour market 
outcome has shown that, typically, general high school effects on outcomes work through 
the choice of attending university or engaging in job search and are, in this sense indirect. 
Conversely, estimated effects of private schools do not vary when those interactions are 
taken into account. 
From the modelling point of view, this paper has placed considerable emphasis on 
simultaneity issues, coherently with some previous contributions in this literature. With the 
aim of tackling those issues, multivariate probability models with partial observability have 
been developed. Results support the adopted modelling strategy, as both high school 
choices and selectivity issues matter for the estimation of the effects of interest. Ignoring 
those issues would have led to wrong conclusions in most cases. 
The picture emerging from this paper extends previous findings for Italy. Family 
background plays a central role in determining school choices, while choices have relevant 
effects on subsequent educational and economic paths. By deepening the separation 
between generalist and vocational tracks, the reform of secondary high education which 
will be implemented in the near future might have the effect of increasing the role of 
parental backgrounds in shaping individuals’ lives. An effective functioning of the 
mechanisms designed in order to guarantee the ‘equal dignity’ of tracks –such as the 
possibility of track changes after the initial choice— appear as a crucial feature of the 
implementation phase for preventing intergenerational persistence and social segmentation 
to increase. As for the other topical dimension of the school debate, i.e. school provision, 
the negative effect of private schools estimated in the academic performance equation 
indicates that, on average, private schools are less effective than public ones in enhancing 
subsequent educational outcomes. 
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Table 1: The distribution of high school degree types  
 Private 
school ? 
No Yes Total  Percent 
General school?           
No          
Number of 
cases 
  9574 972  10546 68.87 
Row 
frequencies 
  90.78 9.22     
Column 
frequencies 
  71.30 51.51     
          
Yes        
Number of 
cases 
  3853 915  4768 31.13 
Row 
frequencies 
  80.81 19.19     
Column 
frequencies 
  28.70 48.49     
          
          
Total   13427  1887  15314   
Percent   87.68  12.32     
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Table 2: High school degree types and parental background 
  Probability of graduating in a 
general school 
  Probability of graduating in a 
private school 










14.06 14.84    8.67  8.29 
Junior high school  21.97  23.02    11.28  11.62 
High school  46.57  51.21    15.04  17.15 
University degree  78.97  81.76    18.33  15.31 
 
 
Table 3: High school degree types and parental occupation 
  Probability of graduating in 
a general school 
Probability of graduating in a 
private school 








Self employed shop 
seller/retailer 
32.81 30.28  22.46  21.71 
Craft 21.92  24.20  11.88  16.89 
Farmer 13.40  13.41  8.17  6.15 
Entrepreneur 32.86  32.26  22.70  22.58 
Professional 53.75  52.38  20.30  20.00 
Manager 66.29  79.31  18.79  18.62 
Teacher 68.00  67.60  6.50  13.31 
White collar high 
level 
40.22 47.73  11.42  16.57 
White collar low 
level 
35.18 42.04  10.77  15.45 
Blue collar high 
level 
15.62 14.34  8.20  10.80 
Blue collar low level.  15.45  18.17  7.87  9.87 
Not available/ does 
not know 
27.99 24.37  14.15  10.74 
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Table 4: High school degree types and junior high school marks 
  Probability of graduating in 
a general school 
Probability of graduating in 
a private school 
sufficiente (D)  10.17  13.81 
buono (C)  23.63  12.10 
distinto (B)  43.56  11.32 
ottimo (A)  68.84  9.23 
 
 
Table 5: High school degree types and academic performance 
 Probability  of  attending 
university 
 Probability  of  taking 
exams quickly* 
Whole sample   40.81    45.64 
      
Graduated in istituti 
tecnici professionali 
22.34   38.62 
      
Graduated in a liceo  81.67    49.88 
      
Graduated in a public 
school 
40.02   46.13 
      
Graduated in a private 
school  
46.42   42.68 
*conditional on university attendance 
 
 
Table 6: High school degree types and early labour market outcomes 
 Probability  of  job 
search after 
graduation 
 Probability  of 
being employed* 
 Probability  of 
being low paid** 
Whole sample   67.71    42.77    24.76 




80.95  49.18  24.23 
       
Graduated in a 
liceo 
40.47  16.40  31.31 
       
Graduated in a 
public school 
68.41  43.24  25.17 
       
Graduated in a 
private school  
62.65  39.01  21.13 
*Conditional on job search, excludes the self employed 
**Conditional on being employed. Low pay defined as bottom quartile of the sample distribution of 
hourly net pay 
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Table 7: Models of academic performance  
    (1) Endogenous choices and selection    (2) Exogenous choices and selection 
    P(general)    P(private)   P(university)   P(fast)   P(university)   P(fast) 
General school                0.429  (5.97)    0.153 (1.77)   0.469  (39.71)    0.084 (5.22) 
Private  school                -0.049 (0.79)   -0.196 (2.39)   -0.040 (2.65)   -0.061 (3.07) 
Female   0.096  (11.59)    0.031  (6.03)    -0.031  (2.68)   0.027 (1.79)   -0.036 (3.59)   0.031 (2.24) 
Resides in the north east    -0.013  (1.00)    -0.019  (2.70)    0.001 (0.08)   -0.013 (0.65)   0.006 (0.42)   -0.008 (0.40) 
Resides in the centre    0.004  (0.34)    -0.056  (8.55)    0.015  (1.00)    -0.152  (8.18)    0.015  (1.06)    -0.156  (8.26) 
Resides in the south    0.010  (0.81)    -0.039  (5.68)    0.064 (4.40)   -0.242  (12.73)    0.065 (4.53)   -0.263  (14.18) 
Has 1 sibling    -0.069  (5.88)    -0.043  (6.19)    -0.063  (4.14)          -0.061  (4.20)       
Has 2 siblings    -0.081  (6.20)    -0.051  (6.81)    -0.083  (4.77)          -0.079  (4.81)       
Has 3 siblings    -0.085  (4.76)    -0.060  (5.99)    -0.090  (3.87)          -0.087  (3.90)       
Has 4 or more siblings    -0.149  (6.23)    -0.053  (3.98)    -0.106  (3.38)          -0.105  (3.48)       
Father’s  educational  degree                              
Junior high school    0.034  (2.65)    0.016  (2.06)    0.003  (0.21)   0.001 (0.05)   0.003 (0.18)   -0.005 (0.20) 
High school    0.117  (7.24)    0.031  (3.03)    0.092  (4.73)   0.027 (0.99)   0.087 (4.78)   0.005 (0.18) 
University   0.295  (11.26)    0.061  (3.81)    0.225  (6.40)   0.051 (1.34)   0.212 (7.12)   0.013 (0.39) 
Not reported    0.043  (1.26)    0.031  (1.46)    -0.050  (1.30)   -0.036 (0.60)   -0.051 (1.31)   -0.040 (0.62) 
Mother’s  educational  degree                              
Junior high school    0.040  (3.32)    0.014  (1.92)    0.031  (2.27)   0.038 (1.83)   0.031 (2.27)   0.032 (1.43) 
High school    0.141  (8.94)    0.058  (5.69)    0.089  (4.37)   0.076 (2.78)   0.083 (4.59)   0.054 (2.06) 
University   0.281  (9.40)    0.052  (2.90)    0.148  (3.75)   0.116 (2.93)   0.136 (3.89)   0.095 (2.61) 
Not reported    0.163  (3.86)    0.051  (2.03)    -0.028  (0.58)   -0.030 (0.43)   -0.032 (0.69)   -0.037 (0.50) 
Father’s  occupation                              
Self employed shop 
seller/retailer 
  0.127 (5.77)   0.130 (8.31)    0.105 (4.03)   0.093 (2.44)   0.099 (4.07)   0.060 (1.61) 
Craft    0.045 (2.29)   0.035 (2.69)    0.056 (2.52)   0.065 (1.89)   0.054 (2.44)   0.055 (1.49) 
Farmer   -0.013  (0.48)    0.016  (0.94)    0.046  (1.57)   0.039 (0.82)   0.051 (1.72)   0.032 (0.63) 
Entrepreneur   0.088  (3.44)    0.136  (7.44)    0.129  (4.31)   0.107 (2.54)   0.122 (4.29)   0.070 (1.66) 
Professional   0.127  (5.17)    0.079  (4.80)    0.151  (5.14)  0.087 (2.29)  0.148 (5.23)   0.051 (1.36) 
Manager   0.148  (6.15)    0.058  (3.77)    0.130  (4.45)   0.093 (2.62)   0.122 (4.40)   0.068 (1.89) 
Teacher   0.065  (2.07)   -0.045 (2.53)  0.103  (2.58)  0.052 (1.24)  0.096 (2.42)   0.049 (1.12) 
White collar high level    0.075  (4.16)    0.008  (0.66)    0.107 (5.16)   0.082 (2.68)   0.102 (4.97)   0.069 (2.16) 
White collar low level    0.056  (2.80)    0.005  (0.41)    0.089 (3.88)   0.056 (1.70)   0.087 (3.80)   0.043 (1.25) 
Blue collar high level    -0.033  (2.10)    -0.005  (0.51)    0.010 (0.56)   0.037 (1.25)   0.010 (0.57)   0.038 (1.22) 
Not reported    0.025  (0.75)    0.022  (1.08)    0.108  (2.85)   0.078 (1.43)   0.103 (2.72)   0.058 (1.01) 
   31
    (1) Endogenous choices and selection    (2) Exogenous choices and selection 
    P(general)    P(private)   P(university)   P(fast)   P(university)   P(fast) 
Mother’s  occupation                              
Self employed shop 
seller/retailer 
 0.009 (0.36)  0.045 (2.70)   -0.013 (0.45)   -0.029 (0.72)   -0.015 (0.51)   -0.042 (0.95) 
Craft    0.020 (0.54)   0.055 (2.20)    0.024 (0.57)   0.000 (0.00)   0.020 (0.47)   -0.012 (0.18) 
Farmer   -0.049  (1.11)    -0.024  (0.88)    -0.020  (0.42)   -0.083 (1.14)   -0.025 (0.52)   -0.085 (1.06) 
Entrepreneur   0.004  (0.07)    0.025  (0.66)    0.018  (0.24)   0.046 (0.48)   0.013 (0.17)   0.041 (0.40) 
Professional   0.047  (0.93)    0.015  (0.49)    -0.012  (0.19)   -0.074 (1.09)   -0.016 (0.26)   -0.082 (1.11) 
Manager   0.177  (3.22)   -0.004 (0.14)  0.149  (2.11)   -0.126 (2.39)  0.142 (2.03)   -0.147 (2.63) 
Teacher   0.042  (1.74)   -0.008 (0.56)  0.027  (0.93)   -0.047 (1.35)  0.025 (0.84)   -0.048 (1.28) 
White collar high level    0.072  (3.01)    0.026  (1.74)    0.055 (1.96)   -0.029 (0.83)   0.050 (1.81)   -0.044 (1.18) 
White collar low level    0.036  (1.61)    0.014  (0.99)    -0.001 (0.05)   -0.046 (1.35)   -0.005 (0.18)   -0.053 (1.43) 
Blue collar high level    -0.062  (2.36)    0.011  (0.63)    -0.079 (2.60)   -0.066 (1.34)   -0.080 (2.65)   -0.060 (1.11) 
Not reported    -0.008  (0.46)    -0.001  (0.08)    -0.044  (2.32)   -0.050 (1.75)   -0.046 (2.40)   -0.046 (1.50) 
Junior high school mark (D 
to A) 
                            
Buono  (C)   0.146 (11.67)   -0.020 (3.11)  0.089  (6.02)   0.047 (1.87)   0.085 (6.44)   0.032 (1.30) 
Distinto  (B)   0.331 (23.25)   -0.032 (4.40)  0.163  (7.06)   0.088 (2.67)   0.153  (10.04)    0.065 (2.61) 
Ottimo  (A)   0.530 (35.89)   -0.051 (6.83)  0.245  (6.85)   0.125 (2.85)   0.225  (12.59)    0.103 (3.92) 
Missing    0.164 (7.76)   0.022 (1.97)    0.098 (4.09)   0.108 (3.02)   0.092 (4.06)   0.083 (2.30) 
High school enrollment at                                     
13    -0.013 (0.81)   0.035 (3.25)    0.055 (2.71)   0.053 (2.21)   0.056 (2.78)   0.044 (1.78) 
15    -0.023 (1.22)  0.015 (1.43)   -0.081 (3.86)   -0.009 (0.25)   -0.079 (3.78)  0.004 (0.12) 
16 or more    0.020  (0.54)    0.026  (1.40)    -0.048  (1.16)   -0.159 (2.00)   -0.051 (1.25)   -0.171 (1.88) 
Born before 1970    -0.100  (2.29)    0.141  (4.89)    -0.150  (1.32)   -0.230 (1.05)   -0.144 (1.27)   -0.265 (1.05) 
Born between 1970 and 1973    -0.147  (5.59)    0.113  (6.97)    -0.124 (2.66)   -0.116 (1.18)   -0.121 (2.63)   -0.104 (0.94) 
Born    in  1974    -0.074 (4.07)  0.021 (1.98)   -0.067 (2.15)   -0.102 (1.78)   -0.065 (2.08)   -0.097 (1.52) 
Born    in  1975    -0.029 (2.57)  0.007 (0.92)   -0.009 (0.46)   -0.054 (1.58)   -0.007 (0.35)   -0.057 (1.50) 
Born    in  1977   0.176 (9.60)   -0.023 (2.19)   -0.027 (1.07)   -0.050 (1.60)   -0.036 (1.61)   -0.041 (1.30) 
High school mark (36 to 60)                                     
from  41  to  45                0.082 (6.13)   0.061 (2.93)   0.081 (6.01)   0.052 (2.39) 
from 46 to 50                0.183  (12.78)    0.125  (5.68)    0.184  (12.82)    0.103  (4.82) 
from 51 to 55                0.295  (16.67)    0.249  (9.39)    0.293  (16.55)    0.214  (8.95) 
from 56 to 59                0.335  (14.26)    0.280  (8.83)    0.334  (14.18)    0.237  (8.31) 
60               0.428 (17.74)  0.367 (11.36)  0.426 (17.58)  0.312 (11.55) 
Has failed during high school                -0.070  (3.97)    -0.071  (2.42)    -0.072  (4.06)    -0.069  (2.15)   32
    (1) Endogenous choices and selection    (2) Exogenous choices and selection 
    P(general)    P(private)   P(university)   P(fast)   P(university)   P(fast) 
Has  changed  high  school                -0.059 (2.81)   -0.008 (0.23)   -0.054 (2.58)  0.002 (0.05) 
Age at end of high school                0.004  (0.42)    0.029  (1.64)    0.003  (0.38)    0.033  (1.68) 
One grandparent has  
university degree 
  0.068  (4.72)    0.015  (1.68)                     
Mother was retired when 
individual was 14 
       -0.034  (1.96)                     
ρgp (general;private)    0.330    (17.86)           
ρlu (general;university)    0.071    (0.67)           
ρls (general;speed)    0.036    (0.30)           
ρpu (private;university)    0.024    (0.28)           
ρps (private;speed)    0.231    (1.72)           
ρus (university;speed)    0.338    (2.88)           
Ignorability of general high 
school. H0: ρgp=ρgu=ρgs=0 
  0.0000    [3]           
Ignorability of private high 
school. H0: ρgp=ρpu=ρps=0 
  0.0000    [3]           
Significance of overall 
correlation structure. 
  0.0000    [6]           
Significance of instruments 
for high school choices 
  0.0000    [3]           
Exclusion of instruments 
from university equation 
  0.6553    [2]           
Significance of instruments 
for selection into university. 
  0.0000    [4]           
Exclusion of instruments 
from speed equation 
  0.3386    [4]           
Number of observations    15295    15295    6231 
Log likelihood    -22028.041    -6562. 8803    -3874.0788 
Model’s chi2    0.0000    [219]    0.0000  [60]   0.0000  [56] 
Note: The model in column (1) is estimated via simulated maximum likelihood, using a GHK simulator with 130 random draws. The models in column (2) are univariate probits. 
The table reports marginal effects evaluated at the mean of explanatory variables. Asymptotic t-ratios in brackets refer to underlying coefficients. P-values from hypotheses tests 
are reported, degrees of freedom in square brackets. The excluded category is: technical or vocational high school,  public high school, male, resides in the north west, has no 
siblings, has both parents with no or elementary degree in low level manual occupations, reported a mark of D at junior high school, enrolled at high school at 14, is born in 1976, 
reported a mark between 36 and 40 at high school, has never failed at high school, has never changed high school, has no grandparents with university degree and his/her mother 
was not retired when the individual was 14.   33
Table 8: Models of early labour market outcomes 
    (1) Endogenous choices and selection    (2) Exogenous choices and selection 
    P(search)   P(employment)    P(low  pay)   P(search)   P(employment)   P(low  pay) 
                     
General  school   -0.130 (2.03)   -0.197  (4.20)  0.176 (2.02)  -0.280 (26.14)  -0.293  (20.3)    0.060  (2.24) 
Private school    0.045  (0.76)    -0.011  (0.15)    -0.166  (2.07)  0.019  (1.46)  0.003  (0.14)    -0.030  (1.35) 
Female   0.049  (4.44)    -0.096  (8.12)    0.156  (8.31)  0.062  (7.22)  -0.087  (7.94)    0.107  (7.17) 
Resides in the north east    0.004  (0.31)    0.057  (3.35)    -0.079 (3.55)  0.022  (0.17)  0.056  (3.30)   -0.050  (2.78) 
Resides in the centre    0.017  (1.35)    -0.174  (11.10)    0.138  (4.88)    0.015  (1.25)    -0.169  (11.35)    0.080  (4.22) 
Resides in the south    0.015  (1.23)    -0.412  (26.75)    0.414 (9.44)   0.013 (1.09)   -0.400 (27.79)  0.265  (11.15) 
Has 1 sibling    0.063  (4.88)    0.031  (1.77)    -0.011  (0.45)  0.054  (4.44)  0.036  (2.11)    0.005  (0.22) 
Has 2 siblings    0.088  (5.97)    0.037  (1.79)    0.026  (0.88)  0.075  (5.53)  0.045  (2.29)    0.042  (1.76) 
Has 3 siblings    0.080  (4.09)    0.038  (1.41)    0.025  (0.61)  0.067  (3.56)  0.043  (1.65)    0.041  (1.21) 
Has 4 or more siblings    0.114  (4.28)    0.021  (0.62)    0.050 (0.98)   0.095 (3.70)  0.028  (0.86)  0.061  (1.41) 
Father’s educational degree                                     
Junior high school    0.0001  (0.01)    -0.011  (0.71)    0.025  (1.28)  0.005  (0.38)  -0.007  (0.50)    0.014  (0.88) 
High  school   -0.049 (2.78)   -0.041  (1.96)  0.058 (1.94)  -0.033  (2.05)  -0.039  (1.93)    0.027  (1.16) 
University   -0.169 (5.70)   -0.120  (2.95)  0.159 (2.06)    -0.130 (5.34)   -0.122 (3.20)  0.072  (1.17) 
Not  reported   -0.021 (0.62)   0.005  (0.10)  0.167 (2.95)  -0.018  (0.52)  0.011  (0.25)    0.145  (2.95) 
Mother’s educational degree                                     
Junior high school    -0.005  (0.40)    -0.023  (1.65)          0.0001  (0.04)    -0.022  (1.59)       
High  school   -0.070 (3.85)   -0.035  (1.63)         -0.048 (3.09)   -0.033 (1.62)      
University   -0.159 (5.06)   -0.056  (1.13)         -0.121 (4.41)   -0.073 (1.52)      
Not  reported   -0.108 (2.49)   0.005  (0.09)         -0.088 (2.07)   -0.018 (0.34)      
Father’s occupation                                     
Self employed shop 
seller/retailer 
 -0.145 (5.93)   -0.002  (0.07)   -0.009  (0.21)    -0.128 (5.65)   -0.014 (0.51)  -0.024  (0.77) 
Craft   -0.098 (4.75)   0.015  (0.62)  0.005 (0.16)    -0.093 (4.49)  0.006  (0.27)  0.004  (0.16) 
Farmer   -0.064 (2.35)   -0.014  (0.45)   -0.079  (1.76)  -0.064  (2.32)  -0.022  (0.74)    -0.069  (2.05) 
Entrepreneur   -0.161 (5.73)   0.073  (2.14)   -0.041  (0.88)  -0.148  (5.56)  0.058  (1.79)    -0.034  (0.96) 
Professional   -0.187 (6.98)   0.018  (0.50)   -0.028  (0.52)  -0.166  (6.50)  0.002  (0.05)    -0.029  (0.70) 
Manager   -0.098 (3.94)   -0.010  (0.29)  0.021 (0.42)  -0.077  (3.30)  -0.011  (0.34)    0.006  (0.13) 
Teacher   -0.083 (2.65)   -0.029  (0.54)   -0.001  (0.01)    -0.077 (2.48)   -0.033 (0.62)  -0.005  (0.06) 
White collar high level    -0.091  (4.84)    -0.007  (0.30)    0.023 (0.68)    -0.082 (4.44)   -0.013 (0.59)  0.012  (0.45) 
White collar low level    -0.099  (4.83)    0.012  (0.48)    -0.023 (0.63)  -0.093 (4.51)  0.002  (0.08)   -0.020  (0.69) 
Blue collar high level    -0.021  (1.30)    0.060  (3.37)    -0.046 (1.80)  -0.026 (1.58)  0.055  (3.13)   -0.024  (1.14) 
Not  reported   -0.140 (3.97)   -0.046  (1.07)   -0.127  (1.85)  -0.136  (3.86)  -0.060  (1.44)    -0.111  (2.31)   34
    (1) Endogenous choices and selection    (2) Exogenous choices and selection 
    P(search)   P(employment)    P(low  pay)   P(search)   P(employment)   P(low  pay) 
Mother’s occupation                                     
Self employed shop 
seller/retailer 
 -0.037 (1.38)   0.032  (0.94)         -0.031 (1.15)  0.022  (0.65)      
Craft   0.000  (0.01)    0.086  (1.82)          0.007  (0.17)    0.069  (1.44)       
Farmer   0.072  (1.65)    -0.066  (1.32)          0.066  (1.50)    -0.055  (1.12)       
Entrepreneur   -0.172 (2.45)   -0.063  (0.63)         -0.168 (2.39)   -0.085 (0.86)      
Professional   -0.005 (0.11)   -0.101  (1.34)        0.001 (0.02)   -0.087 (1.15)      
Manager   -0.083 (1.71)   -0.148  (1.68)         -0.059 (1.26)   -0.144 (1.65)      
Teacher   -0.001 (0.04)   -0.084  (2.42)        0.006 (0.25)   -0.086 (2.50)      
White collar high level    -0.025  (1.07)    -0.047  (1.51)          -0.015  (0.63)    -0.057  (1.86)       
White collar low level    -0.011  (0.49)    -0.021  (0.72)          -0.006  (0.25)    -0.018  (0.61)       
Blue collar high level    0.084  (3.20)    0.037  (1.20)        0.079 (2.98)  0.050  (1.62)      
Not  reported   -0.002 (0.11)   0.004  (0.23)         0.0001 (0.01)  0.002  (0.09)      
Junior high school mark (D to 
A) 
                              
Buono (C)    -0.032  (2.41)                -0.023  (1.90)             
Distinto (B)    -0.084  (4.05)                -0.051  (3.69)             
Ottimo (A)    -0.143  (4.59)                -0.083  (5.35)             
Missing   -0.041  (1.90)                -0.027  (1.34)             
High school enrollment at                                     
13   0.009  (0.52)                0.009  (0.54)             
15   0.046  (2.51)                0.042  (2.28)             
16 or more    0.029  (0.82)                0.030  (0.82)             
Born before 1970    0.231  (2.97)                0.229  (2.92)             
Born between 1970 and 1973    0.152  (4.05)                0.145  (3.90)             
Born  in 1974    0.118  (4.58)                0.113  (4.31)             
Born  in 1975    0.047  (2.65)                0.044  (2.48)             
Born  in 1977    -0.042  (2.05)                -0.022  (1.18)             
High school mark (36 to 60)                                     
from 41 to 45    -0.042  (3.62)                -0.044  (3.68)             
from 46 to 50    -0.112  (8.83)                -0.113  (8.77)             
from 51 to 55    -0.163  (10.2)                -0.166  (10.28)            
from 56 to 59    -0.237  (11.2)                -0.240  (11.29)            
60   -0.296  (13.7)                -0.297  (13.77)            
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    (1) Endogenous choices and selection    (2) Exogenous choices and selection 
    P(search)   P(employment)    P(low  pay)   P(search)   P(employment)   P(low  pay) 
Has failed during high school    0.020  (1.26)                0.018  (1.11)             
Has changed high school    0.018  (0.97)                0.017  (0.90)             
Age at end of high school    -0.020  (2.61)                -0.020  (2.60)             
Search mode current job                                     
Knew the employer 
personally 
           -0.005  (0.19)               -0.004  (0.19) 
Contacted by the 
employer 
           -0.104  (3.57)               -0.083  (3.70) 
Job advertisement                -0.053  (1.93)                -0.042  (1.89) 
Sending CVs to 
employers 
           -0.052  (2.44)               -0.043  (2.46) 
Public competition                -0.253  (4.53)                -0.177  (4.99) 
Family firm                0.051  (1.22)                0.043  (1.19) 
Employment agencies                -0.081  (2.24)                -0.064  (2.23) 
Part-time               -0.171  (6.40)                -0.131  (7.56) 
Work and training contract                0.058  (2.31)                0.050  (2.43) 
Fixed term contract                -0.069  (2.77)                -0.059  (2.85) 
Occupation                                    
White collar high level                -0.134  (1.66)                -0.108  (1.80) 
White collar low level                -0.005  (0.25)                -0.004  (0.26) 
Blue collar high level                -0.003  (0.14)                -0.003  (0.18) 
Employee of family 
firm 
           0.088  (1.69)               0.075  (1.64) 
Apprenticeship              0.230  (5.26)                0.219  (5.66) 
Public sector                0.009  (0.35)                0.008  (0.34) 
Industry                                    
Agriculture               0.022  (0.46)                0.022  (0.53) 
Retail trade                0.035  (1.61)                0.026  (1.41) 
Transport & 
communication 
           0.004  (0.11)               0.000  (0.01) 
Financial services                -0.131  (2.51)                -0.103  (2.64) 
Public administration, 
Education, Health 
           -0.018  (0.47)               -0.019  (0.61) 
Housing or IT services                0.079  (2.07)                0.067  (2.01) 
Other services                0.105  (3.88)                0.092  (3.95)   36
 
    (1) Endogenous choices and selection    (2) Exogenous choices and selection 
    P(search)   P(employment)    P(low  pay)   P(search)   P(employment)   P(low  pay) 
6≤Firm size<15                -0.108  (4.93)                -0.088  (5.44) 
15≤Firm size<50                -0.166  (6.62)                -0.129  (7.62) 
50≤Firm size<100                -0.223  (6.47)                -0.163  (7.81) 
Firm size≥100             -0.267  (8.27)               -0.206  (11.48) 
Job started in 1995                -0.090  (3.62)                -0.073  (3.79) 
Job started in 1996                -0.095  (4.13)                -0.077  (4.37) 
Job started in 1997                -0.053  (2.67)                -0.045  (2.81) 
λgp (general;private)   0.338  (17.96)                   
λgr (general;search)   -0.242  (2.37)                   
λge (general;employment)   -0.106  (1.81)                   
λgl (general;low pay)   0.041  (0.43)                   
λpr (private;search)   -0.085  (0.85)                   
λpe (private;employment)   -0.005  (0.05)                   
λpl (private;low pay)   0.225  (1.73)                   
λre (search;employment)   -0.284  (3.56)                   
λrl (search;low pay)   0.063  (0.46)                   
λel (employment;low pay)   -0.501  (2.68)                   
Ignorability of general high 
school. H0: λgp=λgr=λge=λgl=0 
 0.0000  [4]                  
Ignorability of private high 
school. H0: λgp=λpr=λpe=λpl=0 
 0.0000  [4]                  
Significance of overall 
correlation structure. 
 0.0000  [10]                   
Exclusion of instruments 
from search equation 
 0.1943  [2]                  
Significance of instruments 
for selection into search 
 0.0000  [20]                   
Exclusion of instruments 
from employment equation 
 0.4062  [20]                   
Significance of instruments 
for selection into employment 
 0.0216  [15]                   
Exclusion of instruments 
from low pay equation 
 0.4318  [15]                     37
 
    (1) Endogenous choices and selection    (2) Exogenous choices and selection 
Number of observations    14420    14420    9764    4176 
Log  likelihood    -25686.232   -7261.268  -5513.3071   -1868.704 
Model’s chi2    0.0000  [258]    0.0000  [60]    0.0000  [40]    0.0000  [55] 
Note: The model in column (1) is estimated via simulated maximum likelihood, using a GHK simulator with 130 random draws. The models in column (2) are univariate probits. 
The table reports marginal effects evaluated at the mean of explanatory variables. Asymptotic t-ratios in brackets refer to underlying coefficients. P-values from hypotheses tests 
are reported, degrees of freedom in square brackets. The excluded category is: technical or vocational high school,  public high school, male, resides in the north west, has no 
siblings, has both parents with no or elementary degree in low level manual occupations, reported a mark of D at junior high school, enrolled at high school at 14, is born in 1976, 
reported a mark between 36 and 40 at high school, has never failed at high school, has never changed high school, has no grandparents with university degree and his/her mother 
was not retired when the individual was 14, found current job via family networks, works full time on a permanent contract, works in private sector manufacturing for a small 
firm, started current job in 1998. 
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Table 9: Direct effects of high school choices 
  (1) Academic performance    (2) Early labour market outcomes 
 P(university)    P(fast)    P(search)    P(employment)    P(low  pay) 
                            
General school  0.365  (4.95)    0.007  (0.08)    -0.139 (1.89)    -0.069  (1.27)    0.081  (0.86) 
Private school  -0.051  (0.77)    -0.221  (2.67)    0.021  (0.32)    -0.013  (0.18)    -0.147  (2.01) 
Attends university                    -0.305  (6.96)    0.084  (0.78) 
Does job search        -0.128  (1.20)                   
Note: Column (1) reports selected marginal effects obtained estimating the model of Table7, column 1, augmented with a job search equation, including the job search dummies 
among regressors of the exam speed equation. Column (2) reports selected marginal effects obtained estimating the model of Table8, column 1, augmented with a university 
attendance equation, including a university dummy among regressors of the employment and low pay equations. Marginal effects are evaluated at the means of explanatory 
variables. Asymptotic t-ratios in brackets refer to underlying coefficients. Both models are estimated via simulated maximum likelihood, using a GHK simulator with 130 random 
draws 
 
 
 
 